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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900355-CA 
v. : 
MATTHEW KAHL, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant• : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and commitment 
revoking defendant's probation for a conviction of robbery, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 
(1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court retain its authority to revoke 
defendant's probation and reinstate his original sentence? This 
jurisdictional issue presents a question of law which is subject 
to a "correction of error" standard or review. City of 
Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert. 
denied, U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990); Provo City 
Corporation v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989). 
2. Did the State proceed with due diligence in seeking 
to revoke defendant's probation? It is well established that 
revocation of probation is within the sound discretion of the 
court. "When it appears that the trial judge has exercised 
discretion in suspending imposition of sentence or in revoking 
probation and imposing sentence, after a hearing • • . . the 
judgment of the trial court should not be molested." Williams v. 
Harris/ 106 Utah 387, 149 P.2d 640, 642 (1944) (citations 
omitted). See also State v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d 487, 488 (Utah 
1981). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language and provisions upon which the State relies 
are included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Matthew Kahl, pled guilty on February 26, 
1981, to a charge of robbery, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1990) (Record 
[hereinafter R.] at 10-14). On April 9, 1981, defendant was 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term of not less than 
one year nor more than fifteen years and ordered to pay a fine in 
the amount of $10,000 (R. at 21-22). Both the sentence and the 
fine were stayed and defendant was placed on probation for two 
years on the following conditions: 
1. The usual and ordinary conditions 
required by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole. 
2. Pay restitution in the amount of $ 431.02 
at a rate to be determined by the Department 
of Adult Probation and Parole. 
3. Enter, participate in and complete the 
program at the Odyssey House. 
4. Defendant is to pay extradition costs of 
$ 1,331.95. 
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(R. at 21-23). 
On June 29, 1981, the court issued an order to show 
cause based on allegations that defendant had violated the terms 
and conditions of his probation (R. at 28-31). At a hearing on 
the matter, held July 28, 1981, defendant admitted the 
allegations against him and the court ordered defendant to 
undergo a 90-day evaluation at the Utah State Prison, after 
completion of which defendant was to return to the court for 
sentencing (R. at 33-38; copies of the court's minute entry and 
pronouncement of sentence are attached hereto as Addendums A and 
B). Defendant absconded from custody on September .17, 1981f 
before completion of the 90-day evaluation, and a bench warrant 
was issued for his arrest September 29, 1981 (R. at 40, 42, 56, 
58). When defendant failed to appear for sentencing, the bench 
warrant was continued on November 2, 1981 (R. at 43). 
On June 30, 1982, defendant was sentenced to two years 
in a Wisconsin State Prison for a conviction of robbery (R. at 
52-55). The Utah State Department of Adult Probation and Parole 
(APPD) placed a detainer on defendant at the Wisconsin Prison (R. 
at 55; see Addendum C). 
On April 2, 1990, defendant was arrested on the bench 
warrant originally issued September 9, 1981 (R. at 58). The 
court issued another order to show cause based on allegations 
that defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his 
probation (R. at 61). In a minute entry of the order to show 
cause hearing, the court found that "defendant had previously 
admitted to violating previously granted probation" (R. at 73; a 
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copy of the court's minute entry is attached hereto as Addendum 
D). In the Judgment and Commitment issued June 4, 1990, the 
court revoked defendant's probation and reinstated his original 
sentence, commitment to issue forthwith (R. at 78-80; a copy of 
the Judgment and Commitment is attached hereto as Addendum E)* 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts pertinent to this appeal are contained in the 
statement of the case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court retained its authority to revoke 
defendant's probation and reinstate his original sentence because 
the revocation proceedings were properly initiated during the 
probationary period. Furthermore, the State acted diligently in 
attempting to revoke defendant's probation when it issued a bench 
warrant for defendant's arrest after he absconded and later 
issued a detainer with Wisconsin prison authorities upon learning 
that defendant had been convicted of a subsequent offense in that 
state• 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS PROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO REVOKE 
DEFENDANT'S PROBATION AND REINSTATE HIS 
ORIGINAL SENTENCE. 
Defendant argues that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to revoke his probation and reinstate his previously 
stayed sentence at a revocation hearing held in May 1990. For 
the first time on appeal to this Court, defendant attempts to 
support his argument with the allegation that because the 
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probation statute in effect at the time he was placed on 
probation in 1981 did not contain a tolling provision, the term 
of his two year probation expired in 1983. However, a general 
rule of appellate review in criminal cases is that some form of 
specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of 
the trial court record before a reviewing court will consider 
such claim on appeal. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 
(Utah 1989). Although defendant argued generally that any 
tolling of the probationary term was limited by State v, Green, 
757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988), he failed to "distinctly and 
specifically" state the ground he now raises on appeal before the 
trial court; thus, he has failed to preserve his statutory 
construction argument for review by this Court. Notwithstanding 
his apparent waiver, defendant's argument is simply not supported 
by a reasonable interpretation of the probation statute or 
applicable case law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1980) (a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Addendum F) was in effect at the time 
defendant was placed on probation on April 9, 1981. Utah Code 
Ann. §77-18-1 (1990) was in effect at the time defendant's 
probation was revoked on May 23, 1990 and contained an express 
tolling provision not present in the (Supp. 1980) version of the 
probation statute: 
The running of the probation period is tolled 
upon the filing of a violation report with 
the court alleging a violation of the terms 
and conditions of probation or upon the 
issuance of an order to show cause or warrant 
by the court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8)(b) (1990). 
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A, The Trial Court Retained Jurisdiction to Revoke 
Defendant's Probation and Reinstate His Sentence• 
The Utah Supreme Court recently considered the extent 
of a trial court's authority under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 
(Supp. 1981) in Smith v. Cook, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5 (Utah 
1990). The Smith court expressly noted that their holding was 
applicable to probationers who had been placed on probation under 
section 77-18-1 (Supp. 1981). Although defendant was placed on 
probation under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1980) the 
language and provisions of section 77-18-1 (Supp. 1981) are 
2 
substantially the same as those in the (Supp. 1980) version 
(neither version contains an express tolling provision); 
therefore, this Court should apply Smith to resolve the present 
case. 
The 1981 amendments to section 77-18-1 made minor stylistic and 
procedural changes which do not affect the issues raised here. 
3 
As noted previously, defendant relies on State v. Green, 757 
P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988) for the proposition that the trial 
court acted outside legislatively established limits when it 
revoked defendant's probation. However, Green simply does not 
stand for the asserted proposition. Although Green rejected an 
interpretation of section 77-18-1 (Supp. 1984) that would allow 
for a tolling of the probation period it is easily distinguished 
from both Smith and the present case. In Green, the probation 
revocation proceedings were not even initiated until after the 
termination of defendant's statutorily imposed eighteen-month 
probation period pursuant to section 77-18-1(10)(a) (Supp. 1984). 
Under that circumstance, the Green court reasoned that tolling 
would be improper because individuals who had been placed on 
probation would be "in a perpetual state of limbo; although their 
probation would appear to have terminated . . .[the] defendants 
would actually be subject to a continued term of fictional 
supervision." Smith, slip op. at 9 (citing Green, 757 P.2d at 
464). The Green court did not address the circumstance present 
in this case where the revocation proceeding was properly 
initiated within the probation period. L^• a t 465 n.3. 
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The Smith court considered the question of whether 
probation can be revoked when the revocation proceeding is 
initiated but not completed before the expiration of a judicially 
imposed probation period. Ici. at 5. Interpreting section 77-18-
1 (Supp. 1981)r the Utah Supreme Court stated that there was 
nothing in that version which "compels the conclusion that the 
revocation proceedings must be completed, as opposed to 
initiated, within the probation period." Id. at 6. The court 
further stated that the due process concerns expressed in Green 
were simply not implicated in a situation where the revocation 
proceedings were properly initiated within the probationary term. 
Id. "Without any statutory or policy considerations to the 
contrary, we see no reason to limit a trial court's authority to 
revoke or modify probation." 3^ d. See also State v. Jamesonf 146 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5 (Utah 1990) (distinguishing Green on the 
ground that Jameson's probation had not automatically terminated 
when probation revocation was initiated). 
Applying Smith to the present facts, it is clear that 
the trial court retained jurisdiction to revoke defendant's 
probation and reinstate the original sentence because the 
revocation proceeding was initiated four months into defendant's 
two year probationary term. On June 29, 1981, the trial court 
issued an order to show cause based on allegations that defendant 
had violated his probation (R. at 28-31). At a hearing on the 
matter defendant admitted the allegations against him and the 
court ordered defendant to undergo a 90-day evaluation at the 
Utah State Prison, after completion of which defendant was to 
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return to the court for sentencing (R. at 33-38; see Addendums A 
and B). However, defendant absconded from custody on September 
17, 1981, before completion of the 90-day evaluation, and a bench 
warrant was issued for his arrest (R. at 40, 42-43, 56, 58). 
The issuance of an order to show cause in July 1981 was 
sufficient to retain the trial court's jurisdiction. "[I]n order 
for a court to retain its authority over a probationer who is not 
actively evading supervision, the probationer must be served with 
the order to show cause within the period of probation." Smith 
4 
149 Utah Adv. Rep at 6. Recognizing that section 77-18-1 (Supp. 
1981) did not expressly deal with this issue, the Smith court 
noted that the statute placed a "significant amount of emphasis 
on the nature and degree of notice to which an individual is 
entitled prior to a revocation hearing." The court found that 
the emphasis on notice in section 77-18-1(5)(b) and (c) (Supp. 
5 
1981) was "consistent with the assertion that a court retains 
the authority to revoke probation if the probationer is served 
The Smith court declined to reach the issue of whether a 
different rule may need to be followed where, as in the present 
case, the probationer was actively evading the supervision of the 
probation authorities. However, the Smith reasoning suggests 
that such a situation presents an even more compelling case for 
extending the trial court's jurisdiction, especially under the 
circumstances present in this case where the revocation 
proceeding was initiated during the probationary term. ^d. at 6. 
See also United States v. Martin, 786 F.2d 974, 975 (10th Cir. 
1986) (probation term tolled while defendant was an absconder 
from supervision); United States v. Fisher, 895 F.2d 208, 212 
(5th Cir.) (issuance of warrant properly extended jurisdiction 
beyond the maximum statutory term and the period would have 
tolled anyway for the time during which defendant was not under 
probationary supervision as a result of his own wrongful action 
or inaction), cert, denied, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2192 (1990). 
See section 77-18-1(4)(b) and (c) (Supp. 1980) for similar 
language in effect at the time defendant was placed on probation. 
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with notice of the revocation proceedings within the probation 
period." The court further noted that the above assertion was 
consistent with the rationale underlying Green. Thus, where, as 
in this case, a probationer not only receives notice within the 
probation period, but also admits the allegations against him in 
a hearing on the matter, the due process notice concerns 
expressed in Green are simply not implicated. Therefore, because 
defendant received notice within the meaning of Smith when he was 
served with an order to show cause four months into his 
probationary term, the trial court retained jurisdiction to 
revoke his probation and reinstate the original sentence. 
B. The State Exercised Due Diligence in Defendant's 
Probation Revocation Proceeding. 
Alternatively, defendant asserts that the State "failed 
to pursue disposition of the probation revocation charges in a 
timely manner" because the State did not extradite defendant from 
Wisconsin or "issue unlimited warrants to obtain custody of him 
when he was released from the Wisconsin prison;" therefore, he is 
entitled to "release from prison and dismissal of the case" (Br. 
of App. at 7-8). Defendant's argument misconstrues applicable 
case law which fails to support his assertion. 
There is substantial authority for the position that 
due process requires reasonable diligence on the part of the 
State in the issuance and execution of an arrest warrant for an 
alleged parole or probation violation. McCowan v. Nelson, 436 
F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1970). See United States v. Berry, 814 
F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1987) (warrant must be executed within 
a reasonable time to preserve jurisdiction). In order to 
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determine whether the State has exercised due diligence* in 
executing a warrant it is necessary to consider the 
"circumstances of the particular case." Simon v. Moseley, 452 
F.2d 306, 309 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Hill# 719 F.2d 
1402, 1405 (9th Cir. 1983) (court must examine all the 
circumstances of the case to determine whether the warrant was 
executed within a reasonable time). Relevant factors for 
consideration include whether the probationer had absconded from 
the jurisdiction or was imprisoned for another offense during the 
probationary period as well as the reasons behind the State's 
delay in execution of the warrant. Fisher, 895 F.2d at 211 n.3. 
Compare State v. Chavez, 694 P.2d 927, 930 (N.M. App. 1985) 
(setting out pertinent factors for determining whether a 
probation revocation hearing is brought within a reasonable 
time). 
Applying the above factors to the present case it is 
clear that the State used due diligence in attempting to execute 
the bench warrant originally issued in 1981. As previously 
noted, defendant absconded from custody in September 1981. 
Although the record is vague as to defendant's activities during 
his approximate nine year hiatus from Utah, it is cleeir that 
defendant was sentenced to two years in a Wisconsin state prison 
for a conviction of robbery (R. at 52-55). Upon learning that 
defendant had been apprehended in Wisconsin in approximately June 
of 1982, APPD placed a detainer on defendant which was ultimately 
Defendant also apparently served a 16 or 18 month sentence in 
the Nevada State Prison for the offense of possession of a credit 
card without the owner's consent (T2. at 8). 
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forwarded to the Wisconsin prison (R. at 55; see Addendum C). 
However, Wisconsin authorities failed to inform APPD of 
defendant's release (Transcript of order to show cause hearing, 
May 23, 1990 [hereinafter T2.] at 7, 12). 
Defendant appears to assert that the failure of 
Wisconsin authorities to inform APPD of his release somehow 
required the State to "issue unlimited warrants to obtain custody 
of him" (Br. of App. at 7). Defendant's assertion is simply not 
supported by the applicable case law. It is well settled that 
where a warrant has been properly issued within the probationary 
term, "the execution of that warrant may be held in abeyance for 
the service of an intervening sentence." Gaddy v. Michael, 519 
F.2d 669, 674 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 998 (1976). See 
Hill, 719 F.2d at 1404 (execution of warrant may await the 
outcome of pending criminal charges without amounting to 
unreasonable delay); Small v. Britton, 500 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 
1974) (revocation warrant need not be executed immediately after 
it has been issued and incarceration in a state institution is a 
good reason for delay in the execution of a warrant). Thus, the 
State acted diligently in (1) issuing a warrant for defendant's 
arrest and (2) in placing a detainer on defendant pending 
completion of his Wisconsin sentence. 
Furthermore, defendant's own conduct frustrated 
completion of his probation revocation proceeding when he 
absconded prior to completion of his 90-day evaluation and 
subsequently failed to provide information as to his whereabouts. 
See Berry, 814 F.2d at 1410. Contrary to defendant's assertions, 
11-
his is not a case where there has been unreasonable delay in the 
completion of revocation proceedings against a probation violator 
whose whereabouts are known or could be known with reasonable 
diligence. See United States v. Gernie, 228 F.Supp. 329, 335 
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (delay of over 11 years in serving a timely 
issued warrant for violation of probation was unreasonable where 
(1) no efforts were made to execute warrant; (2) defendant lived 
continuously and openly at the same address; (3) his draft board 
had a record of his address, as did welfare authorities; and (4) 
he was arrested by the state authorities on several occasions); 
People v. Cooper, 54 Misc.2d 42, 280 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (N.Y. Co. 
Ct. 1967) (lack of due diligence where there was no showing in 
the record that the defendant was in hiding or evading service of 
a warrant, or that he was incarcerated after a conviction for 
another crime). See also Hill, 719 F.2d at 1405 (two and one 
half year delay unreasonable where defendant did not contribute 
to the delay, probation office knew his address and would easily 
have located him, no effort was ever made to serve him with the 
warrant and when he learned of its existence defendant promptly 
turned himself in). Compare Fisher, 895 F.2d at 211 (three year 
delay did not result in denial of due process where probationer's 
actions and inaction tended to frustrate execution of the 
warrant). Therefore, in the absence of notification from 
Wisconsin authorities upon the completion of defendant's term, it 
cannot reasonably be argued that the State failed to act 
diligently. Defendant's whereabouts were simply unknown. Under 
the above circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its 
-12-
discretion in determining that the State was not obligated to 
extradite defendant from Wisconsin or make other efforts to bring 
him back to Utah after Wisconsin authorities failed to inform the 
7 
State of defendant's release (T2. at 11). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the lower court's imposition of sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this &_ day of February, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING. 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Lynn R. Brown and Elizabeth Holbrook, SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER 
ASSOC, attorneys for appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this Yciav of February, 1991. 
wlutM faash/L. 
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Although prejudice to defendant may be a relevant factor for 
consideration, Chavez, 694 P.2d at 930, defendant has not 
attempted to argue that he was prejudiced by the delay in the 
execution of his arrest warrant on appeal to this Court. Rather, 
he asserts generally that the tolling provision of section 77-18-
1(8)(b) (Supp. 1990) allows the State to indefinitely suspend a 
probationer's sentence in violation of Green, 757 P.2d 465 (Br. 
of App. 7-8). As stated previously, the Green court's reasoning 
focused on the impropriety of tolling probation where the 
proceedings were not initiated -ubflfcil after the expiration of a 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR 
C M
 T i A K F COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plantiff, 
VS. 
MATTHEW KAHL (JAIL) 
Defendant. 
CRIMINAL CASE NO. CR 81-23* 
ORDER FOR 90-DAY EVALUATION 
BY DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS 
OFFENSE ROBBERY 
A Felony of the 2ND Degree 
This matter came before the court for pronouncement of sentence 
on the 2 8 T H day of JULY , 19JJ2 Plantiff appeared 
by and through GREGORY BOWN , (Deputy) County Attorney 
for SALT LAKE County. Defendant appeared in person and by his 
attorney, LYNN BROWN , whose office address is 
f SALT LAKE CITY, 333 SOUTH 2ND EAST 
Utah. 
There being no legal reason presented to the court why judgment 
should not be pronounced, and it appearing to the Court that imprisonment 
may be appropriate in this case, but that more detailed information is 
desirable as a basis for determining the final sentence to be imposed 
than has been provided by a presentence report, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Defendant is commited to the custody of the Division of 
Corrections for a period not exceeding 90 days from the date hereof, or 
for such additional time as the Court may hereafter grant, not exceeding 
a further period of 90 days, for a complete study of the defendant during 
that time, inquiring into such matters as the defendant's previous 
delinquency or criminal experience, his social background, his capabilities, 
his mental emotional and physical health, and the rehabilitative resources 
or programs which may be available to suit his need. 
0GQ0C4 
- 2 -
2. On or before the expiration of the period of ccrmitment 
defendant shall be returned to the Court for sentencing, and a written 
report of the results of the study, including whatever recomnendations the 
Division of Corrections believes will be helpful to a proper resolution 
of the case, shall be provided to the Court, to the 
jiays County Attorney, and to defendant's counsel not later than 
prior to the time fixed for sentencing. 
3. Unless sooner returned or unless the Court extends the 
time beyond 90 days as provided in the preceding paragraph, defendant 
shall be returned to the Court for sentencing on the 2ND fey
 0f 
NOVEMBER , l g H t the hour of 9:00 o'clock (a.m.) GX&x?. 
4. It is further ordered that the Sheriff of 
SALT LAKE County, Utah, forthwith deliver the defendant to the 
Division of Corrections: (check appropritate place) 
A. At the Utah State Prison XXXXXXXXXXXX 
B. At the Division of Corrections Diagnostic Unit_ 
C. Other (specify) 
5. The Division of Corrections is requested to retain custody 
of the defendant principally: (check appropriate place) 
A. At any appropriate place or places in its discretion 
B. At the Division of Corrections Diagnostic Iftiit 
C. At the Utah State Prison 
D. Other (specify)
 t 
Dated at SALT LAKE CITY, Utah t h i s 3RD 
day of AUGUST 
_. 19±2-
BY THE COURT: 
DEUPTY CLERK 
THB 8-3-81 
HONORABLE DAVID B. DEE, ,JUDGE 
QJmMiu 
1 
(to'c\ S% SI 
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ADDENDUM C 
INC IP! A" I RUIWI 
DA'ir.: JUNE 15, 1982 
NAMH: KAHL, MATTHEW 
"M^ 
COIIRr: THIRD DISTRICT 
cntnrr CASE N O . : CR8i*234 C/"> 
• < • ..7- rr— O' 
JUTO-: DAVID B.' DEE- '•' 
'),• 
mil- ra:n:m:.n ON PROBATION: APRIL 9, 1981 
APPRKSS: MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN JAIL 
orn-Nsr.: ROBBERY 
l:.MrhOYMi;,vr: NONE 
COMMl-NTS: The defendant has been apprehended and has a Court appearance on June 30, 
1982 foV*sentencing. The charge is RobbSry. He was convicted on May 21, 1982. A 
detainer has been placed on the defendant pending outcome of his Court appearance in 
Milwaukee. 
Supportive documents are enclosed for the Court's perusal. 
\^)\ 
m< \ 
»> 
ifrn:i)iAii:. ACTION TAKI:N HY AGENT: NOTIFY THE COURT. 
U'.COWlHN'IVYnoN: INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES AT THIS TIME. 
EUGENE PRESSETT SI HI .Mr-or. f^lMHS'D. SHADOAN' * "DlSliULI A?;IKrl 
WY\\: lhj< fowl is used to rc|X)rt nilc inTnid ions to I lie Court. 
Origin.il stnys in f i l e 
Si fined copy to Court 
Other copies as needed 
APr.r/26 11/SO 
000052 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
^ 
REPORT ^ > » K B * L 
DATE: August 12» 1982 
NAME: KAHL, Matthew 
COURT: Third District 
COURT CASE NO.: & 81-234 
JUDGE: David B. Dee 
DATE RECEIVED ON PROBATION: April 9, 1981 
ADDRESS: Waupum Prison (Wisconsin) 
COMMENTS: 
OFFENSE: ROBBERY 
EMPLOYMENT: 
This agent received word from Dodd, Warrants that the defendant received 
2 years in Waupum Prison for Unarmed Bank Robbery. 
In discussing the matter with your Honor this agent has informed Warrants to 
forward the detainer to that facility. 
Please see enclosed earlier incident report sent to the court 
* 
-/*<8 ~i^-
IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN BY AGENT: Notify the court 
RECOMMENDATION Detainer be forwarded to proper facility 
A W j N^<IX 
GENE PRESSETT SUPERVISOR" (JOMS D. SHADOAN DISTJ TRICT AGENT 
NOTE: This form is used to report rule infractions to the Court. 
Original stays in file 
Signed copy to Court 
Other copies as needed 
mT/MShs 
ADDENDUM D 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
KAHL, MATTHEW 
JAIL 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 811902341 FS 
DATE 05/23/90 
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN 
COURT REPORTER BRAD YOUNG 
COURT CLERK EHM 
TYPE OF HEARING: HEARING 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. SCOTT REED 
D. ATTY. LYNN BROWN 
THIS MATTER COMES NOW BEFOR THE COURT FOR HEARING, APPEARANCES 
AS SHOWN ABOVE. COURT FINDS THAT DEFENDANT HAS PREVIOUSLY 
ADMITTED TO VIOLATING PREVIOUSLY GRANTED PROBATION. 
SENTENCING IS SET FOR JUNE 1, 1990 ©10:30 A.M. APPD IS TO DO 
A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON THE DEFT. 
00G073 
ADDENDUM E 
• f '.LED 
D4&r&CT=GG'JR"» 
IN THE KSlRICr COURT DF THE 'IH1KD JUDICIAL DISTKICT, .IN A ^ KSL.
 (jy ihfj 
SALT LAKE O0ON1Y, STATE OF UTAH Tn.--.i-- <-•» WSRICT 
J U D G M E N T ard C O M M I T M E N T 
-7 ~ Ji,lf
 KVi CLEM 
STATE OF man 
Plaintiff 
- v s -
MATIHLW KAHL 
Defendant 
- ^ 
> * 
. 3 AA 
C3P 
CASE NO. 811902341 FS 
RDBBERY 
2ND DESEE FELONY 
BDNCRABIE PAT B. BRIAN 
^ 
APRIL 9 , 1981 
THIS BEING THE TIME FIXED FQER PASSING OF SENTENCE UPON THE ABOVE NAMED 
DEFENDANT, SAID DEFENDANT APPEARING IN PERSON AND BEING REPRESENTED BY 
WAITER F. BUGDEN AS COUNSEL, THE STATE BEING REPRESENTED BY LYNN PAYNE AS 
CXXJNSKL. THE DEFENDANT IS NOW ASKED IF HE HAS ANY LEGAL CAUSE TO SHOW WHY 
SENTENCE SHOULD NCT BE PASSED UPON HIM IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 77-35-9 
U.C.A. THE DEFENDANT ANSWERING HE HAS NONE, JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE IS 
PRONOUNCED AS FOLLOWS: 
,fIT IS THE JUDGMENT AND SINTENCE OF THIS 
COURT THAT YOU, MATTHEW KAHL, BE OONFINED 
AND IMPRISONED IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON FOR 
A TERM OF NOT IESS THAN ONE (1) YEAR NOR 
MORE THRN FIFTEEN (15) YEARS, AND ORDERED 
TO PAY AFINE IN THE AMOUNT OF $10,000.00, 
AS PROVIDED BY IAW FOR THE CRIME OF 
RDBEERY, A 2ND DEGREE FELONY." 
00GC78 
-2« 
THE DEFENDANT I S NO? PLACED ON PROBATION UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE ADOIT 
PAROLE AND raOBAITCN DEPARTMENT AND I S GRANTED A STAY OF EXECUTION OF 
SENTENCE FOR THE PERIOD OF TWO (2) YEARS, PURSUANT TO THE CONDITIONS LISTED 
IN THE F U E . 
JUNE 1 , 1990 
THE STATE'S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE CEMES NOW CN BEFORE THE COURT FOR 
DISPOSITION. THE DEFENDANT APPEARS IN PERSON AND I S REPRESENTED BY IYNN 
BRCWN AS ODQNSEL, THE STATE BEING REPRESENTED EY ROBERT STOTT AS COUNSEL. 
BASED CN THE REPRESENTATIONS OF COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE AND COUNSEL FOR THE 
STATE, THE COURT FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS VIOLATED THE TERMS OF ELS 
PROBATION AND THE SAME I S REVOKED. THE OLXJKT ORDERS THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED 
TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COMMITMENT HERETOFORE 
IMPOSED. COMMITMENT I S TO ISSUE FORTHWITH. 
AND YCU, N.D. (PETE) HAYWARD, KHKkJJb:F OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, ARE HEREBY 
COMMANDED TO TAKE THE SAID MATTHEW KAHL AND DELIVER HIM WITHOUT DELAY TO THE 
UTAH STATE PRISON, THEN AND THERE TO BE CONFINED IN AOCOREftNCE WITH THE 
COMMITMENT HERETOFORE IMPOSED. 
ISSUED: JUNE 4 , 1990 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN 
DEFUIY CLERK 
finr>f>*7Q 
ADDENDUM F 
UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 
1980 SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT 
TO 
REPLACEMENT VOLUME 8C 
TITLE 77 
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
as enacted by Laws 1980, Chapter 15 
and 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 
as enacted by Laws 1980, Chapter 14 
with index 
Effective July 1, 1980 
THE ALLEN SMITH COMPANY 
Publishers 
Indianapolis, Indiana 46202 
77-17-9 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
him to give bail for his appearance to answer to the proper charge wheft filed, 
and may also require witnesses to give bail for their appearance. 
History: C. 1953, 77-17-8, enacted by L. 
1980, eh. 15, I 2. 
77-17-9. Separation or sequestration of jurors—Oath of officer having 
custody.—(1) The court, at any time before the submission of the case to the 
jury, may permit the jury to separate or order that it be sequestered in 
charge of a proper officer. . 
(2) If the jury is sequestered the officer shall be sworn to keep the jurors 
together until the next meeting of the court, to prevent any person from 
speaking or communicating with them, and not to do so himself on any sub-
ject connected with the trial, and to return the jury to the court pursuant to 
its order. 
History: C. 1953, 77-17-9, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15,12. 
77-17-10. Court to determine law; the jury, the facts.—(1) In a jury 
trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court, questions of fact by 
the jury. 
(2) The jury may find a general verdict which includes questions of law as 
well as fact but they are bound to follow the law as stated by the court. 
History: C. 195S, 77-17-10. enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15,12. 
77-17-11. Jury to retire for deliberation—Oath of officer having 
custody.—After hearing the court's instructions and arguments of counsel, 
the jury shall retire for deliberation. An officer shall be sworn to keep them 
together in some private and convenient place and not permit any person to 
speak to or communicate with them or to do so himself except upon the order 
of the court, or to ask them whether they have agreed on a verdict. He shall 
return them to court when they have agreed and the court has so ordered, or 
when otherwise ordered by the court. 
History: C. 1953, 77-17-11, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15,12. 
77-17-12. Defendant on bail appearing for trial may be commit-
ted.—When a defendant who has given bail appears for trial, the court may, 
at any time after his appearance for trial, order him to be committed to the 
custody of the proper officer to await the judgment or further order of the 
court. 
History: C. 1953, 77-17-12, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15,12. 
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CHAPTER 18 
THE JUDGMENT 
Section 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence—Probation—Period—Onditiona—Revocation. 
77-18-2. Expungement and sealing of court and arrest records. 
77-18-3. Disposition of fines. 
77-18-4. Sentence—Term—Construction. 
77-18-5. Reports by courts and prosecuting attorneys to board of pardons. 
77-18-6. Judgment to pay fine constitutes a lien. 
77-18-7. Costs imposed on defendant—Restrictions. 
77-18-8. Fine not paid—Commitment. 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Probation — Period — 
Conditions—Revocation.—(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest or convic-
tion of any crime or offense, if it appears compatible with the public interest, 
the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the 
defendant on probation for such period of time as it determines. The legal 
custody of all probationers is vested in the court having jurisdiction of the 
offender and the chief agent of the adult probation and parole section of the 
state division of corrections. In cases that do not involve an indeterminate 
sentence, the period of probation may exceed the length of time of the 
maximum sentence that could be imposed. 
(2) Prior to imposing any sentence for an offense for which probation may 
be granted, the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, continue 
the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time for the 
purpose of obtaining a pre-sentence report on the defendant. The contents of 
the report shall be confidential. The court may disclose all or parts of the 
report to the defendant or his counsel as the interest of justice requires. At 
the time of sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or information the 
defendant or the prosecuting attorney may wish to present concerning the 
appropriate sentence. Such testimony or information shall be presented in 
open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(3) After hearing, the court may increase or decrease the probation period 
and may revoke or modify any condition of probation. While on probation, 
and as a condition thereof, the defendant may be required to pay, in one or 
several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on probation and 
may be required to make restitution or reparation to the aggrieved party or 
parties for pecuniary damages as provided in section 76-3-201 caused by the 
offense to which the defendant had pleaded guilty, no contest or for which a 
conviction was had. The defendant may be required to pay amounts required 
under provisions of section 77-32a-l through 77-32a-14. He may also be re-
quired to provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable, to participate in rehabilitation programs as may be available, and to 
serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year. 
(4Xa) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a 
finding that the conditions of probation have been violated, 
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted 
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to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court which author* 
ized probation shall determine whether the affidavit establishes probable 
cause to believe that revocation or modification of probation may be justified. 
If the court determines that there is probable cause, it shall cause to be 
served on the defendant a copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause 
why his probation should not be revoked or modified. 
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing, 
which shall be within seven days of the service upon the defendant unless he 
shows good cause for a continuance, and shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for 
him if he is indigent. The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to 
present evidence as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of 
the affidavit. If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the pros-
ecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations, which need not be 
evidence admissible in a trial. The persons who have given adverse informa-
tion on which the allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses sub-
ject to questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise 
orders. The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own be-
half, and present evidence. 
(e) After hearing, the court shall make findings of fact. Upon determining 
that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may order 
the probation revoked, modified or continued. If probation is revoked, the 
defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be 
executed. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, m e t e d by L. 
1980, eh. 15,12. 
77-18*2. Expungement and sealing of court and arrest records— 
(lXa) Any person who has been convicted of any crime within this state may 
petition the convicting court for a judicial pardon and for sealing of his record 
in that court. At the time the petition is filed and served upon the prosecuting 
attorney, the court shall set a date for a hearing and notify the prosecuting 
attorney for the jurisdiction of the date set for hearing. Any person who may 
have relevant information about the petitioner may testify at the hearing and 
the court, in its discretion, may request a written evaluation of the adult 
parole and probation section of the state division of corrections. 
(b) If the court finds the petitioner for a period of five years in the case of 
a class A misdemeanor or felony, or for a period of three years in the case of 
other misdemeanors or infractions, after his release from incarceration, 
parole or probation whichever occurs last, has not been convicted of a felony 
or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and that no proceeding involv-
ing such a crime is pending or being instituted against the petitioner and 
further finds that the rehabilitation of petitioner has been attained to the 
satisfaction of the court, it shall enter an order that all records in petitioner's 
case in the custody of that court or in the custody of any other court, agency 
or official be sealed. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to viola-
tions for the operation of motor vehicle under title 41. The court shall also 
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issue to the petitioner a certificate stating the court's finding that he has 
satisfied the court of his rehabilitation. 
(2)(a) In any case in which a person has been arrested with or without a 
warrant, that individual after 12 months, provided there have been no inter-
vening arrests, may petition the court in which the proceeding occurred, or, if 
there were no court proceedings, any court in the jurisdiction where the ar-
rest occurred, for an order expunging any and all records of arrest and de-
tention which may have been made, if any of the following occurred: 
(i) He was released without the filing of formal charges; 
(ii) Proceedings against him were dismissed, he was discharged without a 
conviction and no charges were refiled against him within 30 days thereafter, 
or he was acquitted at trial; or 
(iii) The record of any proceedings against him has been sealed pursuant to 
subsection (1). 
(b) If the court finds that the petitioner is eligible for relief under this 
subsection, it shall issue its order granting the relief prayed for and further 
directing the law enforcement agency making the initial arrest to retrieve any 
record of that arrest which may have been forwarded to the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation and the Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification. 
(c) This subsection shall apply to all arrests and any proceedings which 
occurred before, as well as those which may occur after, the effective date of 
this act. 
(3) Employers may inquire concerning arrests or convictions only to the 
extent that the arrests have not been expunged or the record of convictions 
sealed under this provision. In the event an employer asks concerning arrests 
which have been expunged or convictions the records of which have been 
sealed, the person who has received expungement of arrest or judicial pardon 
may answer as though the arrest or conviction had not occurred. 
(4) Inspection of the sealed records shall be permitted by the court only 
upon petition by the person who is the subject of those records and only to 
the persons named in the petition. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18-2, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, 5 2. 
77-18-3. Disposition of fines.—Fines imposed by the district court shall 
be turned into the county treasury, except such fines as are imposed by the 
district court in cases appealed from a circuit court or a municipal justice's 
court, which fines, when collected, shall be by the county clerk covered, one-
half into the county treasury and one-half into the treasury of the city or town 
from which the case was appealed; and except further, such fines as are im-
posed by the district court in cases appealed from precinct justices' courts, 
which fines, when collected, shall be covered by the county clerk into the 
county treasury, and except further as otherwise specifically provided by law. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, 9 2. 
77-18-4. Sentence—Term—Construction.—Whenever a person is con-
victed of a crime and the judgment provides for a commitment to the state 
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